

02 - Introduction

Security ((of) softwares)

Thibaut HENIN

www.arsouyes.org

What is Software Security ?

What is
software Vulnerability ?

Software vulnerability
definition

A defect

that allows

unauthorized actions

Software engineering

How we turn dreams into reality

What we wants

What we get

Specifications

Bugs

Software Security

How we turn nightmares into reality

What we wants

What we get

Security Policy

Vulnerabilities

Two families

i.e. ISO-27000 : 2005 *versus* 2013

Check Lists

i.e. PCI-DSS, ISO-21434 (road vehicles), Mehari,…

Risk Analysis

i.e. Common Criteria (ISO-15408), CSPN, EBIOS,…



Risk Analysis

Short Introduction

Analyse Risks

Two phases



Audit

What we wants

What we get

Security Policy

Security Evaluation

Building a Security Policy

Step 0 – Perimeter

What is the subject

Identification

(name, version, editor, …)

Description

(features / use cases, users, prerequisites, …)

Step 0 – Perimeter

Example with a blog

```
Product        : Speed e-blog
Version number : 2.0
```

Step 1- Assets
Definition

A resource

(information, data, hardware, functionality, …)

That need to be protected

(against malicious agent)

Step 1- Assets
Example

Business assets

A1 - Articles

A2 - Nicknames

A3 - Web browsers

Support assets

A4 - Passwords

A5 - Files – configuration

A6 – Files – source code

A7 - Servers

Step 2- Security Properties

Three main ones

Confidentiality

(only authorized agend can read)

Integrity

(only authorized agent can write)

Availability

(asset can be accessed)

Step 2- Security Properties

Other usefull ones

Authenticity

(the resource is the one that have been sent)

Traceability

(access are recorded on a log)

Non repudiation

(nobody can say « it's not me » or « it's someone else »)

Step 2- Coverage matrix

Assets and properties

Assets	Confidentiality	Availability	Integrity
A1 - Articles			✔
A2 - Nicknames			✔
A3 - Web browsers	✔		✔
A4 - Passwords	✔		✔
A5 - Files - configuration	✔		✔
A6 - Files – source code			✔
A7 - Servers	✔		✔

Step 3 – Threats
Definition

Feared event

(what wrong can happen)

Step 3 – Threats

Example

T1 – Fraudulent modification of article

T2 – Execution on browser

T3 – Fraudulent deletion of article

T4 – Impersonation of writers

T5 – Password theft

T6 – Theft of account

T7 – Fraudulent access to files

T8 – Fraudulent modification of files

T9 – Execution on server

Step 3 – Coverage matrix

Assets by threats

Threats	A1 Articles		A2 Nicknames		A3 Browsers		A4 Passwords		A5 Files Config		A6 Files Source code		A7 Servers	
	I		I		C	I	C	I	C	I	I		C	I
T1 - Modification article	✓		✓											
T2 - Execution, browser	✓		✓		✓	✓								
T3 - Deletion article	✓		✓					✓						
T4 - Impersonation	✓		✓											
T5 - Password theft	✓		✓				✓							
T6 - Account theft	✓		✓					✓						
T7 - File access							✓		✓				✓	
T8 - File changes	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
T9 - Execution, server	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓

Step 4 – Criticity (optionnal)

Product of two parameters

Severity - Consequences on the asset

e.g. if articles are defaced, the branding of the editor is hurt

Probability - Ease of the threat

e.g. access to writers' password database

Step 4 – Criticity

Visually



Step 4 – Criticity (simplification)

For software (since we use booleans)



Step 5- Measures

a.k.a. security function / security features

Things to mitigate the risks

Eg. Access control, backups, updates, training, monitoring, …

Step 5- Coverage matrix

Threats by measures

Mesure	Article modification	Password theft	Execution on server
Authentication & access control	✔		
Secure storage of password		✔	
Input data filtering			✔

Step 5b- Residual risks (optional)

Value after measures take effects

Mesure	New Probability	New Severity	New Risk
Article modification → Access control	1 → 0	1	1 → 0
Password theft → Secure storage	1	1 → 0	1 → 0
Execution on server → Input filtering	1 → 0	1	1 → 0

Security Target
Definition (CSPN / CC)

Document that tells :

« This is how this software claims to be secure »

(all previous content)

Security Policy
Definition

Document that tells :

« How we claims to be secure »

(same but for everything beyond software)

Security Audit
Definition

Procedure that check :

« The claims are effectives »

So what is a software vulnerability ?

Vulnerability

Bypass of Security Policy



Birth of vulnerabilities

Why are they so common ?

By Negligence

« Don’t touch what works »

By Conservatism

« We've always done that way! »

Technical debt

« It takes to much time to do it properly »

« We'll fix it later »

By Incompetence

« I didn’t know »

Out of laziness

« It’s too booooooring »

The error is human

« Oups, I didn’t notice »



Discoveries

By whom ? Why and How ?

It’s a job

Rather twice than once

Security Audit

Planned for certification

Selling your time

By editor, user or agency

Bug Hunting

Opportunistic discoveries (unplanned)

Selling vulnerabilities

To editors (bounties), agencies or mafia

No Disclosure

Keep it secret

Avoid wild exploitation

(minimize damages)

Sell exploits

(no fix means high exploit value)

Life of a vulnerability threat

No Disclosure



Full Disclosure

Publish everything

Force editors to fix

(avoid further exploitation)

Be credited

(and becomes famous)

Life of a vulnerability threat

Full Disclosure



Responsible Disclosure

Brave new world

Tell editor

(negociate a delay)

Then publish

(and becomes famous)

Get a bounty

(and becomes rich)

Life of a vulnerability threat

Responsible disclosure



World Wide Vulnerability Database

CVE

(Common Vulnerability and Exposure)

Unique Identifier

(CVE-AAAA-NNNN)

Edited by MITRE

https://www.cve.org/

Common Vulnerability Scoring System

Score /10

Base score

Options

Likelihood

Exploitation

Vector, Complexity, Authentication

Temporal

Exploit, fix, confidence

Criticity

Impact

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

Environment

Use’s context



How this is handled ?

The real world is full of human beings

Full of Politics

It’s not a vulnerability (it’s a feature)

When auditing : Scope

Marketing vs reality

When bug bounting : Scope and Score

Marketing and Budget vs bounties

Optimistic Ostrich

It works, everything’s good

We’ll see later

Nobody wants to attack us

Paranoid perfectionist

Everything must be perfect

A vulnerability is a proof of incompetence

There always remain a risk

Constructive humility

Where are the weaknesses ?

How can we fix them ?

Continuous improvement

« It’s not perfect but we work toward »



Which side of the force ?

Everything would be about which side you embrace…

Hats…

Good vs Bads ?

C'era una volta il West

Hats colors…

Viewed by White Hats



Hat icons by : flaticon.com

Hats colors…

Viewed by Black Hats



Hat icons by : flaticon.com

Alignments

Dungeons & Dragons (3.5)



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Teams

Attack vs Defense



Hacker icons by : flaticon.com

Unfair Game

Asymetric confrontation

	Blue team (defense)	Red team (attacks)
Defeat	Bad consequences	-
Victory	-	Positive consequences

Karpman's Triangle

Psychological Game

Victim

Persecutor

Saviour

Icons by : flaticon.com

Two Player version

With one free role

Victim

Persecutor

Saviour

Icons by : flaticon.com

Changing position

Build awkwardness



Icons by : flaticon.com

Never ending story
(or at least as a tragedy)

Every one must take care of its own security

(don’t expect any provider to save you)

One can not secure someone else

(don’t expect your client to play fair)



Jobs and positions

And what you should learn

There is something for everyone
(and a lot of paths)

What you like	White / Blue	Black / Red
Humans & organisations	CISO	Auditor
Systems & Networks	Secops, SOC	Pentester
Codes & Softwares	Dev, devsec	Evaluators Bug Hunters
Investigation	Forensic (law enforcement vs anti-virus)	

Icons by : flaticon.com